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Searching for excellence in education: knowledge, virtue and presence? 
 
James MacAllister1, Gale Macleod2 & Anne Pirrie3  
 
Abstract: This article addresses two main questions 1) what is excellence and 2) should 
epistemic excellence be the main purpose of education? Though references to excellence 
have become increasingly frequent in UK education policy, these questions are perhaps 
especially important in Scotland where the curriculum is explicitly for excellence. Following 
Hirst and Peters, it is hypothesised that if the term ‘education’ implies possession of a certain 
breadth of general knowledge and understanding, then the term ‘excellence’ may imply a 
deep grasp of a specific body of knowledge. However, after consideration of Dewey’s 
suggestion that being present in the moment is an excellence of childhood, it is concluded 
that 1) the development of epistemic excellence (having a deep grasp of valuable knowledge) 
should be regarded as an educational purpose rather than the only educational purpose and 
2) pupil engagement with public traditions of knowledge provide necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for education.  
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1. Educational excellence and curriculum purpose 
 
‘Ours is a political culture deeply fractured by fundamental moral 
disagreements. It is also a political culture whose public rhetoric is well-
designed to disguise and conceal the extent of that disagreement by 
invoking an idiom of consensus with regard to values…For what our 
contemporary political culture requires from those who claim public and 
political authority is an appearance of virtue congruent with the rhetoric of 
shared values. And both that appearance and that rhetoric are well served 
by the indeterminacy of the virtue-concepts of contemporary usage’ 
(MacIntyre, 1991, pp. 6-7) 
 
The notion of excellence has been prominent in much latter day UK educational 
policy1. For example, in England the National Teaching Schools Prospectus indicates that all 
teaching schools must be ‘centres of excellence for ITT’ (Initial Teacher Training), and that 
each teaching school must ‘ensure that demonstrably excellent practitioners take 
responsibility for and lead each trainee teachers’ training programme’ (NCL 2011b, 18). 
Furthermore, a future function of teaching schools will be to develop and disseminate 
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excellent teaching practice (NCL 2010). In view of the increasingly frequent adoption of the 
vocabulary of excellence in education policy it is probably important to ask what excellence 
in education might mean; nowhere perhaps more so than in Scotland, where the new school 
curriculum is explicitly for excellence (Scottish Executive 2004). The emphasis on 
excellence in Scotland seems to have been motivated by a belief amongst the policy makers 
that previous curricula had not been adequately enabling all pupils to reach their potential. 
The report of the curriculum review group states that ‘although the current curriculum has 
many strengths, a significant proportion of young people in Scotland are not achieving all 
that they are capable of’ (ibid, 2004, 13). It was thus argued that a Curriculum for Excellence 
(CfE) could better prepare Scotland’s young people for entrance into, and employment in, a 
society rapidly changing under various global, social, political and economic influences.2 The 
new curriculum is the first in Scotland to encompass provision for the entire period of 
schooling from 3-18 (Scottish Executive 2004). It has been confirmed that as of 2012/13, 
pupils will undertake national qualifications in literacy and numeracy, during the ‘senior 
phase’ of their secondary schooling, from 3rd year onwards (Kidner 2010, 3). Eight broad 
curricular areas have been identified, namely: Numeracy and Literacy, Sciences, Expressive 
Arts, Social Studies, Languages, Religious and Moral Education, Technologies, and Health 
and Well-being (ibid 2010, 9). There is also to be an emphasis on inter-disciplinary rather 
than discipline-based study in the areas of literacy, numeracy and health and wellbeing (ibid 
2010, 9). The overarching purpose of the curriculum is to enable all young people to develop 
four ‘capacities’ of excellence, namely: successful learning, confidence, responsible 
citizenship and effective contribution.     
 
However, the CfE has not been received without controversy. Priestley and Humes 
maintain that the ‘historical amnesia’ and ‘lack of theoretical sophistication’ (Priestley and 
Humes 2010, 359) displayed by the architects of the new curriculum has resulted in a 
conceptual muddle; and that the four capacities of excellence have been subject to too little 
critical interrogation. They rightly point out that although previous curricula in Scotland were 
influenced by academic research, (citing the footprints of Hirst and Peters’ forms of 
knowledge view of the curriculum on the Munn Report), the original CfE document did not 
make any specific appeal to any philosophical, sociological or psychological research into the 
curriculum. Priestley and Humes (2010) analyse the CfE using three curricular archetypes 
identified by Kelly (1999), namely curriculum as: 1) content and education as transmission; 
2) product and education as instrumental; 3) process and education as development. They 
suggest that the policy rather unevenly displays features of each curriculum archetype. For 
them, the CfE simultaneously construes knowledge as: 1) ‘something that is constructed by 
learners on the one hand’ (ibid 358); or 2) pre-specified content ‘to be acquired and tested on 
the other’ (ibid 358). They conclude that though a CfE initially had ‘an implicit emphasis on 
process’ that offered hope that the ‘constraining mould’ of Scottish education could be 
broken, more recent documents have regrettably ‘constrained this aspiration, potentially 
reducing the freedom and creativity of teachers and learners, and rendering classrooms 
predictable, limited and uncreative’ (ibid 358-359). We share Priestley and Humes’s concern 
that the new curriculum lacks a coherent underpinning philosophy. However, the main 
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purpose of this paper is to interrogate different meanings of the term excellence, and to 
defend the model of curriculum as content and education as initiation, as advanced by Hirst 
and Peters3. Priestley and Humes seem to prefer a conception of the ‘curriculum as process 
and education as development’ because they consider that the view of curriculum as content 
tends to encourage teachers to focus upon their subject disciplines ‘rather than [on] any 
broader conception of the learning process or the personal development of pupils’ (2010, 
347).  
 
In this respect, we would agree that personal development is a proper and important end for 
education and teaching. However, we will argue that though Peters and Hirst did consider that 
pupils’ engagement with specific bodies of knowledge was crucial to the educational process, 
they also suggested that the purpose of such engagement with knowledge was the 
development of excellence.4 In defending the continued educational merit of disciplines of 
knowledge, we are echoing the view of Lindsay Paterson, another prominent critic of CfE. 
Like Priestley and Humes (2010), he has maintained that the proposed reforms are ‘vague to 
the point of confusion on too many matters to be a proper basis for new educational practice’ 
(Paterson 2007). Paterson is forthright about the damaging lack of debate around the policy 
about the value of human knowledge traditionally made available to pupils through subject 
disciplines. With regard to traditional subject disciplines he states that the curricular reforms 
‘threaten to destroy an inheritance by ignoring it’ (Paterson 2007). Paterson suggests that a 
subject discipline is more than a ‘mere arbitrary collection of facts, despite what is often 
implied by the fashionable orthodoxy. It is indeed a deep foundation of factual knowledge’ 
(Paterson 2009, p 11). We should make it clear that we do not think that subject disciplines 
should be regarded as sacrosanct5. Nevertheless, as we contend below, public traditions of 
theoretical and practical knowledge ought to be regarded as necessary if not sufficient 
conditions for the promotion of education. We shall argue that pupils must ultimately be 
supported actively to engage with such traditions if they are to develop any excellence defined 
as mastery of particular bodies of knowledge. However, in the light of Dewey’s suggestion 
that being present in the moment is an excellence of childhood, we conclude that the 
development of knowledge to a degree that could be described as excellent should be an 
educational purpose rather than the only educational purpose. We take this stance because 
there are other valuable human goods distinct from epistemic excellence (like presence and 
authenticity) that would also seem worthy of attention. We will begin by drawing upon the 
work of Gillies (2007), Hirst and Peters (1975) and Aristotle (2004) so as to address the 
question of what excellence in education might mean. As we shall see, recent public rhetoric 
regarding excellence in education may be ‘designed to disguise and conceal the extent 
of…disagreement [about divergent notions of excellence] by invoking an idiom of consensus 
with regard to values’ (MacIntyre 1991, 6-7). 
  
2. Education for Excellence 
 
A perusal of the Oxford (OED 1991) and Chambers (Chambers-Cambridge 1998) English 
Dictionaries suggests there are at least three different ways in which a person may exhibit 
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‘excellence’. Excellence may involve a person: 1) surpassing others in performance6; 2) 
surpassing one’s own7 previous performance; 3) having good personal qualities (virtues) in 
high degree8. Each of these notions of excellence may well have some educational merit. 
However, they are beset by problems too. While the desire to surpass others in performance 
may motivate some to reach for excellence, it seems somewhat paradoxical to think that all 
pupils can fulfil their potential for excellence, if the hallmark of excellence is surpassing 
others in performance. For example, if Jane clears 1.70m in the high jump, surpassing the 
mark set by all of her classmates, then it seems fair to describe her jump as excellent 
according to the first meaning of the term elaborated here. However, it is hard to see how 
Jill's jump of 1.10m could be described as excellent according to these standards, if it were 
lowest height cleared by anyone in the PE class. Gillies (2007) provides a succinct 
explanation of why reserving the term ‘excellent’ for only the highest performing pupils is 
problematic and logically incompatible with the aspiration of attaining excellence for all. He 
classifies such a notion of excellence as n-excellence where n represents the norm and 
excellence means not just surpassing this norm, but being placed as highest and best in 
relation to the norm. He says that ‘under such a definition, the promotion and pursuit of 
excellence is chimerical: it can only apply to a tiny minority (by definition) and attempts by 
everyone to become excellent are necessarily, logically, doomed to fail’ (ibid, 28). 
Therefore, to our mind the second, and especially the third meanings of the word 
elucidated above may offer more fruitful grounds from which to defend a programme of 
education for excellence for all. To continue with the example, if excellence is about 
surpassing one’s previous performance, then it certainly seems much more plausible to think 
that the performance of all the pupils in the given PE class could be described as excellent. 
Of course this could only be said to be the case if all the pupils have in fact surpassed their 
previous best height. Gillies (2007) classifies such an ipsative (ipsative because the aim is to 
measure educational improvement in reference to personal performance only rather than any 
more general criteria) account of excellence as i-excellence and concludes that the goal of 
attaining excellence for all is possible in theory within this notion of excellence so long as all 
pupils continue to achieve personal bests. However, Gillies (2007) is also probably right to 
suggest that if the measure of excellence becomes entirely self-referential then mediocrity 
may ensue. Having some more general criteria of excellence may serve as a motivation for 
pupils to reach higher than they would otherwise without a target of reference beyond 
themselves. Therefore, the concept of c-excellence (where c refers to general criteria of 
excellence) is considered by Gillies (2007) as an alternative way of measuring excellence. 
However, he again urges caution. He states that though ‘c-excellence is theoretically possible, 
actually achieving it seems less so. To have every school and every pupil reaching standards 
of excellence is at best utopian and at worst delusional. To achieve excellence for all, one 
would think, would require the standards to be set quite low, and so not ‘excellent’ at all’ 
(ibid p 29). We think Gillies touches on an important point here – that if excellence is used 
too liberally and vaguely within educational discourse, then there is a very real danger that 
the word will lose its very meaning, and with that, there will be diminished potential to 
identity pupils’ achievements that are genuinely outstanding (and for particular reasons) as 
opposed to unsatisfactory, satisfactory or good. If all the notions of excellence considered so 
far seem problematical, then why might the notion of education for excellence have come to 
prominence at all? 
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There is undoubtedly a large rhetorical symbolism at play here term. Indeed, we think recent 
use of the term excellence bears the hallmarks of a public rhetoric that invokes an idiom of 
agreement that conceals as much as it reveals (MacIntyre, 1991). In this respect Gillies 
(2007) suggests that the new Labour Government may have adopted the mantra of excellence 
for all as a way of distancing itself politically from its conservative counterparts. As Gillies 
(2007) points out, much of the rhetorical emphasis during the time of new Labour was on the 
provision of excellent schools rather than on excellent performance amongst individuals. This 
is perhaps because the achievement of excellent outcomes for all pupils is a rhetorical rather 
than realistic goal in the first place. However in Scotland, the four capacities that underpin 
the CfE appear to be aspirational statements about the sorts of personal qualities worth 
fostering in pupils (Priestley and Humes 2010) rather than descriptions of how to improve 
pupil performance or school provision. While it is certainly encouraging to see education 
policy makers in Scotland explicitly valuing the development of the pupil as a whole person, 
the vagueness of the four capacities is rather striking (Paterson 2007; Priestley and Humes 
2010). Indeed, we think the vagueness of the four capacities may hide from view the very 
specific bodies of knowledge and skills with which teachers ought to be acquainting their 
pupils, in the mutual search for elusive excellence.  
 
Where, then, might some measure of clarity be found regarding how schools can promote 
excellence? It is our view that the broadly liberal variety of education as initiation into 
valuable knowledge that is advanced by Peters, Hirst and Aristotle can offer some insight into 
the question of how to educate for excellence. Indeed, we think that they can offer more 
secure philosophical foundations for a curriculum founded on the idea of educating for 
excellence than the rather opaque four capacities. We also think that consideration of 
different disciplines of knowledge to be studied by pupils might offer a basis from which 
criteria can be developed to help discriminate between pupils who have attained a genuine 
grasp of an aspect of knowledge and those that have yet to achieve this. (This is broadly in 
line we think with Gillies’s notion of c-excellence).  
 
“Education”...suggests passing on the ultimate values of a 
community, so that the individual can make them his own. “Education” 
suggests not only that what develops in someone is valuable but also that it 
involves the development of knowledge and understanding. Whatever else 
an educated person is, he is one who has some understanding of something. 
(Peters 1972 p 3) 
 
In Education and the Educated Man (1972) Richard Peters suggested that educated persons 
are, in an important sense, defined by their ability to understand a given matter. Peters 
explains that the modern concept of the educated person arose in the nineteenth century, and 
differentiated those who had been trained in some specialist skill or knowledge from those 
who had been broadly educated. He states that ‘we distinguish educating people from training 
them because for us education is no longer compatible with any narrowly conceived 
enterprise’ (Peters 1972, 10). He specifies that the ‘educated’ necessarily come to understand 
knowledge that is of value. For Peters, education involves the idea of a community passing on 
knowledge that has more than instrumental value. He also specified that education ‘must 
involve knowledge and understanding and some kind of cognitive perspective, which are not 
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inert’ and that ‘education at least rules out some procedures of transmission, on the grounds 
that they lack the wittingness and voluntariness on the part of the learner’ (Peters 1970, 45). 
Thus we think Peters is clear that educational activities do not involve pupils passively 
receiving knowledge; pupils must rather be supported to voluntarily engage with and think 
about valuable knowledge so as to develop their understanding of it.  
 
It is often overlooked that Hirst and Peters (1975, 57) suggest that ‘human excellences such 
as autonomy, creativeness and integrity could surely be regarded as aims of education as well 
as culminating points of development’. It is our view that although Peters and Hirst did 
consider pupil engagement with knowledge as crucial to the educational process, they also 
suggested that the purpose of such engagement with knowledge was the development of 
human excellence, construed more broadly. They explain that a person may demonstrate a 
particular excellence whilst lacking the breadth of knowledge indicative of the state of being 
‘educated’. Conversely, they also suggest that a person can be broadly educated without 
having acquired any specific excellences (ibid p 58). Perhaps then, the educated have attained 
a certain breadth of knowledge and/or skills. By contrast, excellence might be ascribed to the 
person who has a particularly deep grasp of a more specific body of knowledge, or the ability 
to perform a particular practical task with great precision and care. While Hirst and Peters 
imply that excellence is most evident when ‘rational capacities’ are developed ‘to the full’ 
(ibid, 53), this stipulation need not preclude distinctively practical and experiential activities 
from promoting education or excellence. Hirst and Peters stress that human excellences are 
qualities of mind and experience (ibid p 55). Furthermore, they indicate that excellences must 
'be displayed in specific activities which have their own specific standards...It is also the case 
that particular skills may have to be mastered for these excellences to develop in full' (ibid p 
54). This suggests to us that in their scheme of thought the emergence of excellence requires 
a thorough and deep engagement with specific bodies of theoretical and/or practical 
knowledge. Seen in this light Hirst and Peters’ account of education for excellence seems to 
have a significant virtue ethical dimension. Hirst and Peter’s account of educational 
excellence certainly bears more than a passing resemblance to that provided by Aristotle 
centuries before. Furthermore, Hirst and Peters do cite Aristotle's notion of human 
potentiality for excellence when attempting to ground their claim that human excellences are 
extremely important to their concept of personal development. 
 
For Aristotle, human beings prosper when they develop their natural moral and intellectual 
capacities to the full. To be virtuous meant being able to develop and thereafter consistently 
exercise one’s natural aptitudes. He theorised that human excellence (anthropine arête) 
involved the exercise of a broad range of intellectual qualities and moral character traits 
(virtues) that in turn promoted long term human flourishing (eudaimonia). Aristotle thought 
that people have a natural capacity (dunameis) for moral virtue that required habit for its full 
development (NE, 1103a24-27). For Aristotle, the virtuous dispositions that frame ‘the good 
life’ consist ‘of actualisations, not of potentialities’ (Frankena 1970, 20). Moreover, each 
person’s potential to actualise virtue in their life is in one important sense relative to the 
natural capacities of each person (NE, 1106a33).9 Aristotle implied that the natural potential 
for virtue with which nature endows each person only becomes mature through repeated 
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performance and action (NE, 1103a27-1103b2). Importantly he emphasises that moral virtues 
and craft-type technical skills only develop over time and if their habitual practice is also 
accompanied by teaching (NE, 1103b9-15). Similarly, he specifies that teaching is required 
for the development of the intellectual virtues too (NE, 1103a14-17). Sherman (2004, 180) 
concludes that in so far as Aristotle’s ‘capacities are not latent excellences, a teacher must be 
on hand’ to oversee development.  
 
Zagzebski (1996) draws upon Aristotle to suggest that not all excellences are virtues; virtues 
are, for her, specific excellences that are especially central to a person’s identity. She 
maintains that a virtue makes a person good whereas excellence may not. We think that 
Zagzebski is right to infer that in Aristotle’s philosophy the intellectual and moral virtues are 
excellences that enrich a person's life in the long term10. A virtue is much more than a one-off 
achievement of excellence. It is rather a deeply desirable habit of action and/or mode of 
thought that gives meaning and value to a person’s life in an enduring way. We therefore 
think that virtues may be excellences that are especially worth educating. In this respect, an 
important distinction can be made between an excellent achievement, say a high mark in a 
history exam, and an intellectual virtue. The knowledge required to pass a school exam with 
aplomb may be forgotten or lose value if the person does not revisit that knowledge and takes 
no further interest in the subject. However, the person of intellectual virtue would want to 
carry on learning and exercising their mental faculties in a way that imbued their life with 
value and meaning. The intellectually virtuous have not only developed their minds then, 
they also continue learning throughout life and for its own sake. If such virtue is 
educationally desirable (as we believe it is), then it is important that teachers aim to 'pass on' 
their love of knowledge to their pupils in order to fuel a lifelong engagement with it amongst 
their pupils. In contrast, merely teaching to the test would not seem like the best means to 
achieve such a teleological attitude to learning in school pupils. Thus far, we have looked at 
three definitions of excellence and have found the first two wanting. The third meaning – 
excellence as virtue, seems to us to offer the most potential as a way of understanding the 
desire to educate for excellence. We shall now explore whether initiation into traditions of 
knowledge is a prerequisite for excellence and education, and if this is all education should 
be for. As we shall see, Aristotle, Hirst and Peters all broadly defended the idea of initiating 
the young into valuable knowledge as the primary means of developing excellence and/or 
virtue.   
 
3. Traditions of knowledge and educational excellence 
 
Yet, if the good life includes excellent activities and if education for it includes 
the formation of dispositions to act in accordance with standards of excellence, 
then education for the good (as well as for the moral) life entails some kind of 
teaching and learning of standards (Frankena 1970, 36) 
 
The capacity in CfE that most obviously links to knowledge is that of successful learning 
(Scottish Executive 2004). But what is it to be a ‘successful learner’? Is ‘learning how to 
learn’ a distinct capacity that is prerequisite for excellence in learning in other areas? 
Christopher Winch (2008) has recently addressed the latter question. He argues that ‘learning 
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how to learn’ is not a general mental power but rather relies on a set of specific abilities. 
Winch puts it thus: ‘if I do have a capacity for learning, I won’t need an ability to learn, let 
alone an ability to learn how to learn’ (Winch 2008, 651). He rather concludes that the 
‘capacity to learn must, in many cases…be supplemented by specific abilities to do certain 
things’ (Winch 2008, 651). He explains that it is such specific abilities as literacy, numeracy, 
speaking, listening and moral virtue that are transferable and can ‘be put to work in a variety 
of contexts in order to assist further learning’ (Winch 2008,  651). Aristotle, centuries before, 
made much the same point. He specified that the young must learn to read and write, as these 
qualities ‘are often the means to learning yet further subjects’ (Pol1 338a 39-40). However, 
Biesta (2009, 39) has suggested that the focus in CfE on developing the personal qualities of 
pupils has led to less focus on the important matter of ‘what pupils and students learn and 
what they learn it for’. We are inclined to agree with this, as well as Biesta’s more recent 
observation that ‘if we give up on the idea that teachers have something to teach and make 
them into facilitators of learning, we do, in a sense, give up on the very idea of education’ 
(2012, p)11. Might it be concluded then that acquainting pupils with certain traditions of 
knowledge is necessary for successful learning and educational excellence? 
 
We think it is plausible to suppose, as Peters (1972) and Aristotle (1981) seem to have done, 
that engagement with traditions of practical and theoretical knowledge is a necessary 
prerequisite for the development of excellence in a given domain of knowledge, precisely 
because such traditions do, to a degree, enshrine standards of excellence in the given 
discipline. While Peters advocated eight forms of knowledge as a platform for excellence, 
Aristotle indicated that four things are to be taught to children in their preparation for a life of 
virtue: reading and writing; physical training; music; and drawing (Politics, 1337b23-26). 
Aristotle does emphasise that learning is not play – the attainment of excellence and virtue 
requires effort and sacrifice. With these broadly liberal accounts of education in mind, it is 
our view that public traditions of theoretical and practical knowledge ought to be regarded as 
necessary if not sufficient conditions for the promotion of education. Furthermore, we also 
think pupils must be supported to actively and habitually engage with such traditions if they 
are to develop epistemic excellence (a deep grasp of a specific body of valuable knowledge), 
and that such educational excellence probably requires substantial effort and achievement on 
the part of the pupil. Two important clarifications should be noted here.  
 
First, to suggest that some sort of engagement with practical or theoretical knowledge is 
necessary for the eventual development of excellence in respect to that knowledge is not to 
suggest that all learning activities must involve direct engagement with such bodies of 
knowledge. The cultivation of motivation and interest often precedes disciplined study 
(Dewey, 2007, MacAllister, 2012b). It is therefore perhaps the case that pupils will only 
come to pursue standards of excellence in a given activity if they are sufficiently motivated 
and interested in that given aspect of knowledge, experience or sphere of activity. Teacher 
and learner both bear a responsibility to locate the intrinsic purpose of and interest in a given 
aspect of experience, skill or knowledge, if that knowledge, skill or experience is to be 
brought to life, let alone in a way that may promote the eventual development of excellence. 
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Secondly, by arguing that engagement with traditions of knowledge is a necessary condition 
for the development of epistemic excellence, we do not mean to suggest that traditions of 
knowledge are in any way fixed and unalterable for all time. Traditions do, and often need to, 
evolve, as the majority of human knowledge is very probably contingent in nature.  
 
‘For tradition, properly understood, means tradere, an active passing on, a 
living transmission of the resources of the past into the present so as to 
enable us to consciously shape the future, not a passive acceptance or re-
endorsement of everything that is merely given’. (Passerin d’Entrèves 1987, 
241) 
 
Passerin d’ Entrèves (1987) suggests that Aristotle does not offer a prescriptive account of 
tradition, but rather a view that traditions are to be ‘actively passed on’, so that life can be 
made anew. Carr (2003) also indicates that great cultural traditions are concerned less with 
engendering broad acceptance of current social convention and more with a continual search 
for truth. And such search for truth in Aristotle’s ethical theory is especially concerned with 
the active development of one’s potential: it is ‘above all a matter of making myself’ more 
virtuous (Carr 2003, 259). Spangler (1998) broadly concurs with this view, and believes that 
Aristotle’s theory of teaching is reliant upon the active intellectual effort and engagement of 
the pupil: ‘without this active principle, the teacher could not achieve his purpose...the 
teacher...must depend upon the light of reason within the student’ (17). Educational excellence 
will then probably depend upon pupils being prepared to commit themselves to mindful, 
disciplined and sustained, study and practice of a given skill or body of knowledge12.  
 
In sum, although it is probably not desirable or possible to reach universal assent regarding 
what counts as ‘valuable knowledge’, it would nevertheless seem important that teachers, 
pupils, academics and policy makers alike engage in dialogue with each other about what 
substantive knowledge could or should be part of the school curriculum and why. The 
confusion and anxiety some Scottish teachers report regarding the implementation of CfE 
(Priestley and Minty 2012) may in part be attributable to the overly brief and cursory 
comments in the policy about what counts as valuable knowledge, and why. It appears that 
some teachers in Scotland feel that knowledge is disappearing from the new curriculum 
and/or that the principle of interdisciplinary learning may undermine the importance of 
subject-based knowledge (Priestley and Minty 2012). If there is substance to these 
misgivings, then the idea of educating for excellence may become harder to realise than 
before. If excellence is to be the object of education, and if (as Hirst and Peters suggest) 
‘excellence' is characterised by great depth of knowledge and/or high standards of practical 
performance in specific domains, then it would seem even more important that the expert 
knowledge of teachers is valued, and that disciplined, domain-specific practice and study on 
the part of pupils is encouraged. However, the account of education for excellence provided 
above is very much centred on knowledge.  We believe that education should have broader 
ends in view than just the refinement and extension of pupils’ knowledge. This is why we 
think that engagement with traditions of knowledge is necessary but not sufficient condition 
for education. In this respect, Dewey gestures towards a different notion of excellence, one 
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that invites the question of whether or not the development and pursuit of excellence in 
respect of the acquisition of knowledge should be the only or primary educational goal.   
 
4. Should excellence in respect of knowledge be the only purpose of education? 
 
‘Children proverbially live in the present; that is not only a fact not to be 
evaded, but it is an excellence. The future just as future lacks urgency and 
body’. (Dewey 2007 p 45) 
 
We have suggested that to educate for excellence might entail sacrificing breadth of 
knowledge and performance for depth of knowledge and performance. If this is the case, 
should such a shift of educational focus be welcomed? It certainly seems desirable enough 
for education to aim at promoting good personal qualities, like virtues, in pupils, in addition 
to deep disciplinary knowledge. Furthermore, if pursuit of such valuable excellences were to 
mean that pupils engaged in more depth with a smaller range of learning material, then 
perhaps pupils’ engagement in education would be enhanced. In theory at least, pupils could 
be focussing more time on what they enjoy learning about and less time on what they do not. 
However, greater time spent on striving for excellence in one activity inevitably means less 
time for other activities. If genuine educational excellence requires pupils to engage to a 
significant degree with disciplinary knowledge (as we are so far suggesting), then is there a 
danger that any curriculum for excellence so construed will tend to promote educational 
activities that are too exclusively focussed on fostering one form of excellence (excellence in 
knowledge) to the neglect of the experience of living in the present.  
 
 Nearly a hundred years ago Dewey (2007) remarked that the capacity of children to dwell in 
the present, rather than the future, ought to be cherished in itself as an excellence as well as a 
prerequisite for educational activities. We take the view that the ability to be wholly present 
in the moment is not in itself an excellence of childhood, for a child could be very present in 
a given moment whilst doing something decidedly undesirable like bullying or hitting 
another child. Nevertheless, we are sympathetic to Dewey’s wider point that educators should 
not neglect pupils’ current interests and experiences when undertaking school activities. 
However, if education is only for the development of excellence in respect to the acquisition 
of knowledge, then there is the risk that a significant portion of pupils will be marginalised by 
the education system. In this regard it is interesting to note that in an inquiry into the 
purposes of education conducted prior to the inception of CfE with Scottish school leavers, 
academic achievement and prowess were deemed by some to be the ultimate barometer of 
educational success, often to the detriment of engagement in schools of pupils who were not 
academically orientated (Pirrie and Lowden 2004). A narrow focus on epistemic excellence 
then may do little to re-engage pupils who already feel alienated by an achievement-driven 
school system. The reality is that many pupils attend school every day with other things on 
their mind than being or becoming excellent. A curriculum that only aims to develop 
excellence through engagement with disciplines of knowledge may not value enough the 
reality and diversity of pupils’ experience. The sole pursuit of epistemic excellence in 
education may not just tend to downplay the worth of all pupils’ present experience: it may 
also come at the expense of a good general education.  
 
Biesta (2011) argues that educators have a responsibility to maintain spaces where freedom 
and individual uniqueness can appear. He suggests that if educational processes are too 
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focused upon the deliberate development of the individual, then important opportunities for 
pupils to come into presence (to exist that is, as a unique person now because of the presence 
of another) may be lost. While Strike (1982) is perhaps right to suggest that too great an 
emphasis on individual authenticity in education may lead to pupil narcissism, he does stress 
that autonomy and authenticity are nevertheless both important human values. To create 
environments where pupils can develop their understanding of specific bodies of knowledge 
is no doubt a vital educational endeavour, and probably a human good. However, to do so at 
the expense of providing pupils with sufficient freedom to be and become authentic persons 
may be to sacrifice opportunity for the cultivation of other important human goods. We are 
therefore inclined to think that epistemological excellence (having a deep grasp of a given 
body of knowledge) should be an educational purpose rather than the only educational 
purpose. We think that schools should be places where independent and authentic thinking, 
being and acting are valued rather than just the demonstration or pursuit of excellence in 
specific domains of knowledge13. They should also we think provide space at times for pupils 
to feel free from the demands of being or becoming excellent. It is self-evident that it will not 
be possible for some pupils to perform to a level that is described as excellent in relation to 
achievement in a particular subject area. There is the risk that such pupils may disengage 
from schooling if the remote target of excellent academic achievement is all that is held 
before them as important or worth working towards.  
 
To conclude, it seems to us that the four capacities of the CfE are laudable in intent but 
ambiguous in detail, much like the wider notion of educating for excellence that also 
animates the Scottish curriculum. At face value there would appear to be nothing 
questionable about the basic aspiration to help all school pupils to reach their highest 
potential. However, this aspiration may be a rhetorical rather than realistic one. Indeed, while 
Priestley and Minty (2012) found that a majority of Scottish educators consulted about the 
CfE in one local authority were broadly sympathetic to the educational purposes enshrined in 
the four capacities of excellence - some of the same Scottish educators also reported finding 
the policy documents ‘woolly and ‘vague’. This is perhaps unsurprising. For as MacIntyre 
(1991) so pithily observes, policy makers are often wont to invoke the language of excellence 
and virtue in a rather rhetorical manner without embracing any specific concept of virtue, or 
providing any clear account about how such virtue might be developed. We therefore think 
that questions should be posed about the intended and possible meanings of educational 
excellence whenever it is employed in education policy; and about how schools might best 
promote educational excellence when this is called for in policy. In this article we have 
considered the possibility that while the educated pupil may have attained a certain breadth 
of knowledge and/or skills, the excellent pupil might rather have a particularly deep grasp of 
a more specific body of knowledge, or the ability to perform a particular practical task with 
great precision and skill.  
 
We have though contended that public traditions of theoretical and practical 
knowledge ought to be regarded as necessary if not sufficient conditions for the promotion of 
education. We think pupils must ultimately be supported to actively shape and engage with 
such traditions for themselves, if they are to develop true excellence in respect to knowledge. 
However, we also take the view that the current experiences and capacities of pupils should 
also be deemed as educationally important, and that too narrow a focus on excellence in 
relation to academic achievement and knowledge may jeopardise this. We have also 
suggested that Scottish educators should seek to promote virtue at least as much as excellence 
amongst their pupils as excellence may only refer to a one-off achievement while virtues are 
intrinsically valuable character traits that promote human flourishing in the long term. There 
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will probably never be universal agreement though about what particular qualities (or virtues) 
are most worth cultivating in young people, or the specific bodies of knowledge, experiences 
and skills with which they should be invited to engage. Neither is there likely to be consensus 
about how pupils should be taught. However, it seems essential that teachers, policy makers, 
pupils and academics discuss these matters openly and in some depth. There is a danger that 
the alluring rhetoric of excellence evident in recent education policy may push such deeper 
conversations to the margins rather than promote them. The purpose of employing notions of 
excellence in educational policy may well be largely rhetorical. However, in practice 
education should reflect purposes above and beyond the development of excellence, and ones 
that are founded on more than rhetoric. 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1 The emphasis on excellence in education has certainly not been restricted to the UK either, but is rather 
evident across the Anglophone world (Priestley 2010 and Gillies 2007). Gillies (2007, 20) notes that a ‘Google 
search for ‘excellence + education’ will generate more than 249 million hits on the World Wide Web’. 
2 For helpful summary and commentary on the various government reports published in relation to a CfE, see 
SPICe’s Briefing Curriculum for Excellence (Kidner, 2010) and Priestley and Humes (2010). For an analysis of 
the extent to which the curriculum for excellence may promote care in Scottish schools see Hedge and 
Mackenzie (2012). 
3 We employ ‘initiation’ rather than ‘transmission’ here as the former term was the one Peters chose to use when 
describing the educational process, and because the latter term does not do justice to the extent to which Peters 
thought education must involve pupils wilfully and actively developing their minds. The term transmission in 
contrast implies that pupils are rather passive in the educational process, a view Peters seems to specifically 
counsel against (1970, 45). 
4 Priestley and Humes (2010, 355) also suggest that the curriculum ought to be based on the ‘accumulated 
wisdom of the world’ citing Dewey in this respect.  
5 We are or course following Hirst here who says that: ‘School subjects in the disciplines as we at present have 
them are in no way sacrosanct…They are necessarily selections from the forms of knowledge that we have’ 
(Hirst 1968, 135-6). 
6 The (OED, 1991) states that the word excellence derives from the Latin root word ‘excellere’ - meaning to 
surpass. The state of excelling thus means to surpass in merit or quality. The (Chambers-Cambridge 1998) 
specifies that being excellent involves surpassing others in good quality. 
7 The (OED,1991) states that excelling oneself involves surpassing ones own previous performance. 
8 The (Chambers-Cambridge 1998) suggests that a person of great virtue has good qualities in high degree. 
9 Each person’s potential for virtue may be limited by their natural capacity, for it. However, we think 
assessment against valid criteria of performance ought to nevertheless be an integral part of helping all pupils to 
acquire genuinely valuable excellences. To recognise that different people have aptitudes relative to their nature 
is not to argue that there are no more general criteria of excellence that all should reach for too. 
10 We think her suggestion that Aristotle’s intellectual virtues are species of moral virtues is quite mistaken. For 
further discussion of this see MacAllister (2012a). 
11 Biesta (2012) draws on the thought of Levinas to argue that though teachers may not be able to directly 
produce the experience of being taught; the constructivist turn in education, where learning is conceived to be 
much more important than teaching, ought to nevertheless be resisted. 
12 However, if teachers are to help pupils to actively develop virtue, and other different types of knowledge to 
an excellent degree then it also seems important that they too possess something of these qualities.  
13 
                                                                                                                                                       
13 We should add that such authentic thinking, acting and being should be valued for all pupils and not just 
pupils of a non-academic bent. 
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